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This book provides a comparative analysis of the exclusion of improperly obtained evidence 
across a number of legal systems, criss-crossing jurisdictional boundaries in a lively and 
engaging manner. Giannoulopoulos’s objective is stated clearly from the outset. In the Preface, 
he invites courts and legislatures within the Anglo-American and Continental legal systems to 
review, in the light of his comparative analysis and normative conclusions, their national 
solutions to problems associated with the exclusion of improperly obtained evidence. 
Importantly, they are further encouraged to ensure that rights considerations are given due 
weight. The obvious vehicle for the proposed “reinvigoration of the rights thesis” in Europe is 
the European Court of Human Rights and an important part of the book is concerned with 
assessing the court’s role in building a rights-based consensus.  
Giannoulopoulos starts by explaining how exclusionary rules apply in the jurisdictions 
considered in this work. Accordingly, as well as comparing the procedural sanction of nullity 
in France to exclusion in England and Wales, we are introduced to the rules of the Greek legal 
system. In chapters 2 and 3, the position as to exclusionary rules for evidence obtained in breach 
of the right to privacy in Greece is compared with that in the United States, and the law in 
England and Wales is compared with France. These jurisdictions represent the ‘four 
comparative pillars’ of the book and Giannoulopoulos challenges the common view that they 
can be characterised simply as adopting either ‘free proof’ or ‘exclusionary’ approaches to the 
law of evidence. His study also reveals that there are unexpected convergences between Anglo-
American and Continental legal systems, but also divergences within the same legal culture.  
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It has long been the case in England and Wales that evidence obtained illegally or improperly 
is admissible if it is relevant, subject to a residual discretion to exclude for unfairness. 
Giannoulopoulos finds a similar but more robust discretionary approach in France, where the 
right to privacy coincides with the right to legal assistance (p.121). Accordingly, he suggests 
that the divide between adversarial and inquisitorial legal cultures is exaggerated, but also 
regrets that this ‘hands-off’ approach focuses on reliability rather than rights considerations. 
This is contrasted with the position in the United States and Greece, where a more ‘principled’ 
rights-based approach to exclusion applies. Giannoulopoulos concludes that there remains a 
considerable difference of opinion across these jurisdictions as to the correct approach to 
evidence obtained in breach of privacy rights, but also detects “surprising convergences” 
(pp.124-5). This, he suggests, is due to the constitutionalisation of criminal procedure, which 
has the capacity to generate a “cross-cultural, rights-centred exclusionary rule convergence” 
that undermines the notion that Anglo-American and Continental traditions are irreconcilable 
(p.122).   
Chapter 4 considers how improperly obtained confessional evidence is treated and 
Giannoulopoulos also senses that there is an “emerging consensus” here, but this time across 
all four of his ‘comparative pillars’. He attributes this to “a growing realisation of the 
importance of custodial interrogation rights and the risks inherent in the use of potentially 
unreliable evidence” (p.125). He explains that France has enjoyed “nothing short of a 
revolution in criminal procedure” (p.133) in relation to the police interrogation phase (the 
garde á vue). This has resulted in courts adopting a ‘rights-based approach’ without the 
previous need to establish some other prejudicial effect. By way of contrast, the automatic 
exclusionary rule in the United States, which was founded on constitutional rights and the 
renowned Supreme Court decision in Miranda v Arizona 384 US 436 (1966), has been 
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weakened by a succession of decisions such as Berghuis v Thompkins 560 US 370 (2010) 
(p.142).   
The picture in England and Wales is described as “mixed” because the power to exclude 
evidence is more often than not a matter of judicial discretion provided for by s.78 of the Police 
and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE), rather than the mandatory exclusion under s.76. It 
is observed that the courts apply a high threshold for oppression that is reserved for rare cases 
of extreme police misconduct and, it can be added, the court’s focus is firmly on the effect on 
the defendant rather than the breach of rights, e.g. Heibner [2014] EWCA Crim 102. Likewise, 
in cases concerned with breaches of the PACE Codes of Practice, the emphasis is on whether 
compliance would have made any difference to the outcome. Giannoulopoulos suggests that, 
notwithstanding the unfortunate decline of Miranda rights, this approach is still likely to send 
“shivers down the spine” of lawyers in the United States (p.150).  
The normative foundations for Giannoulopoulos’s project of persuading Anglo-American and 
Continental legal systems to take rights seriously, as exemplified by Miranda, are addressed in 
chapter 6. Ashworth’s ‘protective principle’ is the “key normative foundation” for the claim 
that legal systems should place renewed emphasis on the protection of rights (p.215). It is 
argued that this provides a strong normative foundation for exclusion of evidence in a wide 
range of situations. However, it is also acknowledged that the ‘rights thesis’ is not 
comprehensive and gaps, for example where third parties act unlawfully, may be ‘plugged’ by 
alternative normative theories that value ‘judicial integrity’. Accordingly, Giannoulopoulos 
proposes a ‘rights (plus integrity) thesis’, which may be characterised as employing the ‘rights 
thesis’ as the senior partner and theories of judicial integrity (p.223)1 as assistants. A full 
account of these is beyond the scope of the book, but it is evident that the ‘rights thesis’ is 
                                                          
1 E.g. A. Duff et al, The Trial on Trial, Volume 3: Towards a Normative Theory of the Criminal Trial (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2007).  
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preferred due to the “simplicity of its logic” and because it is associated with the constitutional 
and human rights that Giannoulopoulos considers fundamental (p.212).   
This normative account might, perhaps, have been expected earlier in the book, but 
Giannoulopoulos’s conception of “reinvigorating the rights thesis” is that, first and foremost, 
this is to be generated from analysis of case law. It is present in the emerging rapprochment he 
detects between Anglo-American and Continental law on the exclusion of confessional 
evidence and, in particular, in respect of custodial interrogation rights considered in chapter 5. 
This reflects on how the movement towards a common understanding coincides with 
developments in the European Court of Human Rights. Giannoulopoulos contends that there 
have been “tectonic shifts” in both EU legislation and Strasbourg case law in relation to 
custodial interrogation rights (p.164) and addresses the important jurisprudence flowing from 
the Grand Chamber judgment in Salduz v Turkey (2009) 49 EHRR 19.  
It is explained that the unanimous judgment in Salduz provided, on the basis of the art 6(3)(c) 
right to legal assistance, for an “absolute, rights-based, categorical exclusionary rule for 
confessional evidence obtained during custodial interrogation without access to a lawyer” 
(p.168). Giannoulopoulos notes that the use of such evidence was held to “irretrievably 
prejudice the right to a fair trial” and amount to automatic violation of art 6, except where there 
were compelling reasons for the interview. This is described as Strasbourg’s “big Miranda 
moment”’ (p.172) but, as Giannoulopoulos concedes, despite the considerable ‘Salduz 
jurisprudence’ that followed, the longevity of the rule was “put in doubt” by the Grand 
Chamber’s judgment in Ibrahim v United Kingdom (2015) 61 EHRR 9. 
It was held in Ibrahim that failure to provide custodial interrogation rights should not amount 
to an automatic breach of art 6 but, rather, should be assessed more broadly as part of the 
‘overall fairness’ of the trial. However, Giannoulopoulos contends that this underestimates the 
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categorical nature of the Salduz rule. He joins with the concurring judges in Dvorksi v Croatia 
(2016) 63 EHRR 7, [Oll-16] in comparing the breach to how some infringements of a fair trial 
were described in Arizona v Fulminante 499 US 279 (1991) as “structural errors” because they 
affect the very integrity of the trial and strike at the fundamental values of the society. Although 
that analysis has been subject to criticism in the United States,2 it appears helpful here, as it 
reflects the fundamental nature of the right to counsel (Gideon v Wainwright 372 US 335 
(1963)) and its importance for the Grand Chamber in Salduz.  
In the light of cases decided since publication, which are considered briefly here, it is clear that 
Giannoulopoulos’s doubts about the longevity of Salduz were fully justified. He hoped that the 
Court would distinguish Ibrahim and limit its effect to terrorism cases but, as the concurring 
judges noted in Beuze v Belgium [2019] 47 BHRC 147, the significance of Ibrahim now 
extends well beyond those exceptional, context-specific restrictions. It includes situations, 
similar to those in Salduz, where there is systematic statutory restriction on the right of access 
to a lawyer of a general and mandatory nature. Accordingly, although the facts of Beuze were 
more akin to Salduz than Ibrahim, it was the latter that was followed. Therefore, it appears that 
the Grand Chamber has, in effect, overruled Salduz and abandoned its ‘bright-line’ rule for art 
6 in favour of an approach that weighs up the ‘overall fairness’ of a trial, taking into account 
the wider public interest and reliability of the evidence.  
In what purported to be further clarification of Salduz, the Grand Chamber in Beuze reiterated 
([142]-[150]) the two-stage test that it had utilised in Ibrahim for assessing whether a restriction 
on access to a lawyer is compatible with the right to a fair trial. According to this test, a court 
determines at the first stage whether, exceptionally, there are “compelling reasons” for 
restricting access to legal advice. At the second stage, the court assesses the impact of the 
                                                          
2 E.g. C. J. Ogletree Jr., “Comment, Arizona v Fulminante: the Harm of Applying Harmless Error to Coerced 
Confessions” (1991) 105 Harv. Law Rev. 152.  
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restriction on the overall fairness of proceedings. However, surprisingly, the Grand Chamber 
held that an absence of “compelling reasons” does not lead necessarily to the finding of a breach 
of art 6(3)(c) and prevent progression to stage two, as the reasons seem to be only relevant to 
the allocation and level of proof. That is, the presence of “compelling reasons” leads to a 
“holistic assessment of the fairness of the entirety of the proceedings”, while their absence 
results in “very strict scrutiny” of the overall fairness assessment, with a rebuttable presumption 
of unfairness. The onus is placed on the government to demonstrate convincingly why, 
exceptionally and in the specific circumstances of the case, the overall fairness of the 
proceedings was not irretrievably prejudiced by the restriction on access to a lawyer.   
Giannoulopoulos argues that the Grand Chamber in Ibrahim misconstrued rather than clarified 
both “the letter and spirit” of the Salduz judgment (p.181) and, arguably, the “hollowing out” 
of “compelling reasons” in Beuze has exacerbated the problem. Further, as “the weight of 
public interest” is among the “non-exhaustive list of factors” to be considered when examining 
proceedings as a whole, it is also apparent that the test allows governments two opportunities 
to make public interest arguments, which unfairly tips the test in their favour.3  
As well as approving the two-stage test in Ibrahim, the Grand Chamber in Beuze repeated its 
interpretation of art 6(3) to the effect that these rights are subsidiary aspects of the overall right 
to a fair trial, rather than “ends in themselves” (at [121-[122]) and concluded that denial of 
legal assistance would not amount to automatic violation of art 6. The Grand Chamber also 
employed the same analysis of art 6 in Correia de Matos v Portugal (2018) 44 BHRC 319. 
However, in a strong dissenting opinion in Murtazaliyeva v Russia (2018) 47 BHRC 263, 320 
Judge Pinto de Albuquerque has criticised the “wishy-washiness” of this interpretation, which 
                                                          
3 R. Goss, “The Undermining of Art 6 ECHR” in P. Czech, L. Heschl, K. Lukas, M. Nowak & G. Oberleitner 
(eds), The European Yearbook on Human Rights 2019 (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2019), 311. 
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he argues “fully divests” art 6 of its meaning. That is, by ignoring its “internal structure”,4 the 
Grand Chamber has wrongly interpreted art 6 as providing a single ‘omnibus’ right, which is 
merely exemplified by paragraphs (1)-(3). Arguably, this treats the paragraphs as if they were 
akin to ‘explanatory notes’ rather than a collection of related, but distinct, independent rights. 
Moreover, this interpretation also overlooks the fact that the text of art 6(3) refers expressly to 
a number of “minimum rights”, which Judge Pavli stated in Einarsson v Iceland (2020) 70 
EHRR 3, [Ol-24] should not be “forced-fed into a less-than-transparent meat grinder labelled 
the overall fairness of proceedings”. Indeed, it is submitted that a plain reading of the 
Convention indicates these are particular rights, rather than just aspects of a general fairness 
right, as is apparent from the official French version of the Convention (tout accusé a droit 
notamment á).   
Giannoulopoulos contends that the law of improperly obtained confessional evidence was left 
in a “perilous state” due to the Grand Chamber in Ibrahim ‘backtracking’ on Salduz (p. 196). 
However, this ‘backtracking’ has only gained pace since publication and, indeed, the 
concurring judges in Beuze described the position as amounting to a “counter-revolution” 
against Salduz (at [25]). It may also form part of what Fenwick has described as the strategic 
“appeasement” of the Strasbourg Court’s critics in national jurisdictions in order to avoid the 
derailment of the European Convention.5 For example, no breach of art 6 was found in Doyle 
v Ireland (2019) 51979/17 despite the applicant not being permitted to have a lawyer present 
in over five days of police interviews, during which he was pressured to confess to murder. 
The applicant did not expressly request the presence of a lawyer during questioning, but this 
was, presumably, because it was police practice at that time to decline any such requests. As a 
                                                          
4 R. Goss, “Out of Many, One? Strasbourg’s Ibrahim Decision on Article 6” (2017) 80(6) M.L.R. 1137, 1141-3.   
5 H. Fenwick, “Enhanced subsidiarity and a dialogic approach – or appeasement in recent cases on criminal justice, 
public order and counter-terrorism at Strasbourg against the UK?” in K.S. Ziegler, E. Wicks and L. Hodson (eds.), 
The UK and European human rights: a strained relationship? (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2018) 213. 
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result of these restrictions he was only able to communicate with his lawyer before or after the 
interviews for a total of 42 minutes, despite being interviewed on 23 occasions over 31 hours. 
The Irish Supreme Court in DPP v Doyle [2018] 1 IR 1 had dismissed reference to Miranda 
principles as irrelevant to the “very different factual and legal context” in Ireland (at [36]-[37]) 
and in Strasbourg it was concluded that, despite the absence of any “compelling reasons” for 
restricting access to legal advice, the overall fairness of the trial had not been irretrievably 
prejudiced. 
Similarly, in Simeonovi v Bulgaria (2018) 66 EHRR 2 the partly dissenting judges accused the 
majority of “turning a blind eye” to the accused’s human rights and legitimating the “legal 
black hole” in which an applicant could be detained for an unspecified length of time, with no 
right to legal assistance and in the absence of “compelling reasons” (at [Ol-2] and [Ol-33]). 
The applicant was detained for a full three days without access to legal advice, despite repeated 
requests, and the Government was unable to prove that he had been informed of his basic rights. 
The Grand Chamber rejected the applicant’s argument that it was implausible that a defendant, 
accused of murder and armed robbery, had not been questioned during these three days and 
found no breach of art 6. Regrettably, such cases are reminiscent of the pre-PACE days in 
England and Wales, when suspects would disappear into police stations without access to legal 
advice, for hours and sometimes even days on end.6 If the Strasbourg Court cannot find such 
detentions to be in breach of art 6(3) one is left wondering, like Judge Pinto de Albuquerque in 
Murtazliyeva v Russia (2018) 47 BHRC 263, 336 quite where this watering down of defence 
rights will stop.  
In light of this recent case law, the prospects have diminished for the cross-jurisdictional, 
Salduz-style rights-based exclusionary rule for which Giannoulopoulos argued. Strasbourg 
                                                          
6 E.g. P. Maguire, My Father’s Watch (London: Fourth Estate, 2008).   
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jurisprudence now seems to parallel the ‘backtracking’ on Miranda principles in the United 
States and any convergence between legal systems appears to be not on the basis of the ‘rights 
thesis’ but, rather, an approach that focuses on the reliability of evidence. As Jackson observes, 
this can be regarded as a vindication of the common law approach, although the Strasbourg 
Court appears to remain committed to supporting rights that promote defence participation in 
criminal proceedings in a manner that the common law would not recognise.7  
Giannoulopoulos concludes that even if the ‘rights thesis’ is in retreat, there are still reasons to 
be optimistic due to the strength of its simple and compelling logic (p.212). In addition, despite 
the rejection of Salduz in previously sympathetic jurisdictions, such as New Zealand and 
Ireland, he finds a hopeful “note of resistance” in the dissenting opinions (p.240). No doubt, 
post-publication, he will have found further comfort in the powerful and persuasive dissents in 
Beuze v Belgium and Doyle v Ireland. In any event, he should feel satisfied that the 
cosmopolitan legal thinking and comparative analysis in this book helps clear a way for the 
‘constitutionalisation’ of criminal evidence at some point in the future.  
 
Richard Glover  
Wolverhampton Law School 
 
 
                                                          
7 J.D. Jackson, “Common Law Evidence and the Common Law of Human Rights: Towards a Harmonic 
Convergence?” (2019) 27(3) Wm. & Mary Bill Rights J. 689, 713.  
